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Adversarial Risk Analysis (ARA)
Improvement over Game Theory.
• Does not assume common knowledge.
• Solves the problem from the point of view of just one of the
players (defender).
• Incorporates their knowledge and uncertainties about their
choices, outcomes as well as their adversary’s preferences, choices
and outcomes.
• Can incorporate different strategic thinking models for the
adversary.
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Insider threat
• A significant and widespread problem that is often under
reported.
• Very little data available.
• Challenging to prevent, detect and counter.
Where?
• Security and intelligence agencies.
• Finance, business.
• Data/knowledge security, cyber security, etc.
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A simple defend-attack-defend model.
Figure: Bi-agent Influence Diagram (BAID) for the
Defend-Attack-Defend insider threat game
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A simple defend-attack-defend model.
• Initially, the organization must choose one of the available
preventive measures d1 in the set D1.
• Having observed the preventive measure taken, the employee will
adopt one of the actions a in A.
• The set S consists of the possible outcomes s that can occur as a
result of the preventive measure d1 and the attack a adopted.
• Once the attack has been detected, the organization will choose
to carry out one of the possible actions d2 in the set D2 to end
the attack, limit any damage and possibly pre-empt future
attacks leading to the final outcomes of both agents, respectively,
evaluated through their utility functions uD and uA.
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A simple defend-attack-defend model.
For its solution, the defender must first quantify the following:
1 The distribution pD(a|d1) modeling her beliefs about the attack
a chosen at node A by the employee given the chosen defense d1.
2 The distribution pD(s|d1, a) modeling her beliefs about the
outcome s of the attack, given a and d1.
3 Her utility function uD(d1, s, d2) which evaluates the
consequences associated with their first (d1) and second (d2)
defensive actions as well as the outcome s of the attack.
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A simple defend-attack-defend model.
Given these assessments, the defender first seeks to find the action
d∗2(d1, s) maximizing her utility
d∗2(d1, s) = arg max
d2∈D2
uD(d1, s, d2), (1)
leading to the best second defense when the first one was d1 and the
outcome was s. Then, they seek to compute the expected utility





2(d1, s))pD(s|d1, a) ds. (2)
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A simple defend-attack-defend model.
Moving backwards, she computes her expected utility for each
d1 ∈ D1 using the predictive distribution pD(a|d1) through
ψD(d1) =
∫
ψD(d1, a)pD(a|d1) da. (3)
Finally, the defender has to find her maximum expected utility
decision d∗1 = arg maxd1∈D1 ψD(d1). This backward induction shows
that the defender’s optimal strategy is to first choose d∗1 and, then,
after having observed s, choose d∗2(d
∗
1, s).
Catch! The above analysis requires the defender to elicit
pD(a|d1). How do you elicit that???
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A simple defend-attack-defend model.
• The defender could model the attacker’s strategic analysis by
assuming that the attacker will perform an analysis similar to
hers to find their optimal attack a∗. To do so, the defender
should assess the attacker’s utility function uA(a, s, d2) and
probability distributions pA(s|a, d1) and pA(d2|d1, a, s).
• But these are not available to the defender - we could model her
uncertainty about them through a random utility function
UA(a, s, d2) and random probability distributions PA(s|a, d1) and
PA(d2|d1, a, s).
• Once these random quantities are elicited, the defender solves
the attacker’s decision problem using backward induction. This
is done by following a process similar to how they solved their
own decision problem but taking into account the randomness in
judgments.
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A simple defend-attack-defend model.
First, the defender finds the random expected utility for each d2 ∈ D2
ΨA(d1, a, s) =
∫
UA(a, s, d2)PA(d2|d1, a, s) dd2. (4)
Then, they find the random expected utility for each pair
(d1, a) ∈ D1 ×A
ΨA(d1, a) =
∫
ΨA(d1, a, s)PA(s|d1, a) ds, (5)
and compute the random optimal attack A∗(d1) given the defense d1
A∗(d1) = arg max
a∈A
ΨA(d1, a). (6)
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A simple defend-attack-defend model.
Finally, once the defender assesses A∗(d1), she is able to solve her
decision problem. The desired predictive distribution by the defender
about the attack chosen a given the initial defense d1 is
pD(a|d1) = pD(A∗ = a|d1) and
pD[A




∗ = x|d1) dx. (7)
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Let’s get real!
Not all employees are the same!
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ARA with segmented employees.
We classify the employees as A1 (the good), A2 (the bad) and A3 (the
ugly), with S1, S2 and S3 being the corresponding outcome sets.
• A1 : Correctly and promptly perform their duties including
following any procedures to prevent insider attacks. Positive
impact on the productivity and work culture of the organization
and will correctly report any suspicious activity, thus helping the
organization to protect itself.
• A2 : While not intentionally working to harm the organization,
will help to create an environment which could increase the
chances of an insider attack through their accidental or
deliberate actions. For e.g. misuse the defensive procedures,
creating a culture of mis-trust and loss in productivity.
Therefore, their actions will be negative to the organization.
• A3 : Actively aim at harming the organization. They are the
ones who intend to launch an insider attack. Their actions will
therefore be very negative to the organization.
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ARA with segmented employees.
Figure: Decision trees for the three games in the insider threat
problem with segmented employees.
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ARA with segmented employees.
• Actions by A1 may reduce the chance of insider attacks as well
as the chance of one of them succeeding. Similarly, actions by A2
may increase the chance of an insider attack as well as the
chance of one of them succeeding.
• Game [c] is identical to the simple Defend-Attack-Defend game.
• ARA solution to games [a] and [b] will consist of identical sets of
steps. Henceforth, we use Ai, i = 1, 2 and Si, i = 1, 2.
• Note that we differentiate between node Ai, which is uncertain,
and node A3, which is a decision node but belonging to a
different decision maker, as this last one is strategic.
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ARA with segmented employees.
Figure: MAID for decision trees [a] and [b] in the segmented
employees insider threat game.
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ARA with segmented employees.
The defender must first quantify the following.
1 Her predictive distribution pD(ai|d1) about the action that will
be chosen at node Ai given the defense d1.
2 Her predictive distribution pD(si|d1, ai) about the outcome of
such action, given ai and d1.
3 Her predictive distribution pD(a3|d1, ai, si) about the attack that
will be chosen at note A3 given the outcome si and actions ai
and d1.
4 Her predictive distribution pD(s3|d1, ai, si, a3) about the
outcome of the attack, given outcome si, actions a3, ai and d1.
5 The utility function uD(d1, ai, si, a3, s3, d2) given their first and
second defensive actions, the outcomes of the attack s3 and si
and the actions a3 and ai.
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ARA with segmented employees.
Given these, the defender works backwards along the decision trees in
Figure 2 [a] or [b]. First, they seek to find the action
d∗2(d1, ai, si, a3, s3) maximizing their utility
d∗2(d1, ai, si, a3, s3) = arg max
d2∈D2
uD(d1, ai, si, a3, s3, d2). (8)
Then, for each (d1, ai, si, a3) ∈ D1 ×Ai × Si ×A3, they seek to
compute the expected utility ψD(d1, ai, si, a3) through
ψD(d1, ai, si, a3) =
∫
uD(d1, ai, si, a3, s3, d
∗
2(d1, ai, si, a3, s3))
pD(s3|d1, ai, si, a3) ds3. (9)
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ARA with segmented employees.
Next, they compute the expected utility ψD(d1, ai, si) for each
(d1, ai, si) through
ψD(d1, ai, si) =
∫
ψD(d1, ai, si, a3)pD(a3|d1, ai, si) da3. (10)
They then find the expected utility ψD(d1, ai) for each (d1, ai), as
ψD(d1, ai) =
∫
ψD(d1, ai, si)pD(si|d1, ai) dsi, (11)




ψD(d1, ai)pD(ai|d1) dai. (12)
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ARA with segmented employees.
• Finally, the defender finds their maximum utility decision as
d∗1 = arg maxd1∈D1 ψD(d1).
• Thus, the defender’s optimal strategy is to first choose d∗1 and
then, after having observed ai, si, a3 and s3, choose action
d∗2(d
∗
1, ai, si, a3, s3).
The above analysis requires the defender to elicit pD(a3|d1, ai, si) and
pD(ai|d1).
• Ai being non-strategic, pD(ai|d1) can be elicited using historical
data/research on employee behavior.
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ARA with segmented employees.
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ARA with segmented employees.
Eliciting pD(a3|d1, ai, si) is less straightforward.
• Can be elicited by modeling attacker’s strategic thinking.
• To elicit it, the defender must assess UA(a3, s3, d2), PA(s3|a3, d1)
and PA(d2|d1, a3, s3).
• Once elicited, the defender solves the attacker’s decision problem
using backward induction - similar to how they solved their own
decision problem.
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ARA with segmented employees - simultaneous actions!
• In the previous model, the employees have been assumed to act
in a sequential manner and only two in any given game.
• But scenarios where any two or all three types of employees act
simultaneously can also be easily modelled using ARA.
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ARA with segmented employees - simultaneous actions!
Figure: MAID for the game where A1 and A2 act simultaneously
followed by A3.
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ARA with segmented employees - simultaneous actions!
Figure: MAIDs for games where A3 acts simultaneously with either
A1 or A2 or both act simultaneously followed by A3.
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Example: simple defend-attack-defend model
We consider an insider threat scenario for an organization dealing
with information/data collection.
• It already has its sites and IT systems protected so that only
authorized personnel are able to access them.
• However, anticipating attacks, the organization is considering
implementing an additional security layer to defend itself.
• The defensive actions (D1) under consideration are:
1 anomaly detection/data provenance tools;
2 information security measures and employee training;
3 carrying out random audits.
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Example: simple defend-attack-defend model
• The malicious insider’s aim could be financial fraud, data theft,
espionage or whistle blowing.
• Regardless, we assume that the attacker’s options (A) refer to its
scale, say small, medium or large.
• Assume that the attack will either fully succeed (S) or fail (F).
• We assume that once the attack is detected, the organisation can
choose to carry out one of the following defensive actions (D2):
1 major upgrade of defenses;
2 minor upgrade of defenses; or
3 no upgrade.
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Example: simple defend-attack-defend model
Assessing defender’s utility function uD(d1, a, s, d2).
• We assume that uD aggregates the monetary costs c(d1) and
c(d2) associated with actions d1 and d2 respectively and the
monetized perceived utilities associated with every (a, s)
combination through
uD(d1, a, s, d2) = c(d1) + c(d2) + u(a, s). (13)
• The costs and perceived utilities are scaled from -100 to 100.
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Example: simple defend-attack-defend model
Assessing defender’s utility function uD(d1, a, s, d2).
Table: Costs associated with defensive actions d1 and d2.
d1 c(d1) d2 c(d2)
Anom. det. & Data prov. -100 Major upgrade -100
Info. Sec.& train. -60 Minor upgrade -25
Random audits -50 No upgrade 0
Table: Monetized Perceived Utility for Every Combination (a, s).
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Example: simple defend-attack-defend model
Eliciting pD(a|d1)
Table: pD(a|d1) elicited by defender using their beliefs
.
D1 A = small A = med. A = large
Anom. det. & Data prov. 0.8 0.15 0.05
Info. sec. & train. 0.2 0.6 0.2
Random audits 0.5 0.4 0.1
Table: PD(a|d1) elicited by defender modeling the strategic analysis
of the attacker
.
D1 A = small A = med. A = large
Anom.det. & Data prov. 0.112 0.102 0.786
Info.sec. & train. 0.706 0.132 0.162
Random audits 0.399 0.119 0.482
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Example: simple defend-attack-defend model
Defender’s expected utility ψD(d1) for each d1 using Eq. (3).
Table: How ψD(d1) changes based on the choice of pD(a|d1)!
D1 when pD(a|d1) - beliefs when pD(a|d1) -strategic thinking
Anom.det. & Data prov. ψD = −69.005 ψD = −36.115
Info.sec. & train. ψD = −29 ψD = −39.051
Random audits ψD = −39.75 ψD = −34.566
• Eliciting pD(a|d1) differently can lead to different optimal
choices (as one would expect)!
• Also true for any of the other subjective choices - utilties and
probabilities - involved.
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Summary & Discussion!
• ARA can be a practical tool for strategic decision making!




• Evolving defend-attack-defend scenarios - using MDP.
• Robustness w.r.t priors and utilities. ARA can be based entirely
on subjective beliefs (and NO DATA)!
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Chaitanya Joshi (with David Rios Insua & Jesus Rios) Insider Threat Modeling: an Adversarial Risk Analysis approach
